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STATE OF U Jf\Ll 
----- - -----------------
~TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAX D. GILES, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 17335 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This appeal is from the decision of the Third 
Judicial Distrit Court denying the defendant's appeal from 
a criminal conviction in the First Circuit Court, 
Coalville Department. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant-appellant was found guilty in the 
First Circuit Court, Coalville Department, by Judge 
Keller, of wreckless operation of a motor boat. An appeal 
was taken from the judgment to the District Court and 
Judge David B. Dee confirmed the lower court's finding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the 
decision of the Circuit Court and the District Court and 
dismiss the criminal charge which was filed against the 
appellant. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On Jtt \ y /. J. i '' t l l ,-_: (j, 'i ( I' j I~ 1 1 X c: i l (-''.-., 
c·; i 1t i()I• f,·/ t I c' ~ '.; l_ ~1 ; 
Gi.l0s with exc<.?eclin:1 d slob1 \·;c1kl-'lf·c.'; •;peed Ln v[olit 
t Lon of section 7 I d -1 7 ( 3 ) . fl[ r. 1 1, .. ," was ordered r 0 
report to the Cc"t(c by August 11., 1•1.CJ. (Record, p. !l 
On July 31, l97CJ, the Fifth Jud1c1oil District Circu~: 
Court mailed a Jct t:0r to Mr. Max D. G.i.les in 1'Jhich r:Jr. 
Giles was told that he had three alternatives avail~ 
able to him to resolve the citation. The first para-
graph indicated that he could post bail in the sum of 
$25.00 and that that bail would be forfeited and the 
case would be closed. (R., p.2) Mr. Giles selected the 
alternative set forth in paragraph one and on August 
12, 1979, forwarded his personal check to the Summit 
County Clerk's Office for the sum of $25. 00. That 
check was receipted by the Fifth Circuit Court and a 
copy of Receipt No. 0318 was forwarded to Mr. Giles 
indicating that on August 15, 1979, the court received 
the $25.00 check. The receipt indicated that the 
money was bai 1 and fine. ( R. , p. 3) On September 30, 
1979, the Fifth Circuit Court Clerk forwarded the 
$25. 00 received from the defendant to the Division 
of Parks and Recreation along with other monies that 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
.1ccept('cl b/ th'CC Cui!cr either as Linns nc for-
k .i :· ( rL E . F: x . i,' 1 ) 
r;· ;·he 31st c1ay of Qr·t.ob2r, 1979, th2 c;·•r:,;pit County 
l\ttu, i·C'/' c~ Office caus2c1 ''· Complaint and Su:nr~ons to be 
is·"' ··I ci<y1inst Max D. G~lros for wreckless ooeration of a 
motoc vehicle in violation of section 73-18-12(1) at Echo 
Res•,,i·oir on July 29, 1979. (R., P.4) This charge was for 
the same factual situation on which the citation was issued. 
The County Attorney conceded on the Court record that the 
citation and the Complaint were for the same incident. 
(Transcript, p.12) The Court record will reflect that at 
no time did the County Attorney's office make a motion to 
amend the citation to allege wreckless operation of a boat. 
The charge of wreckless operation of a motor boat was 
set for trial before the Honorable Larry Keller for the 13th 
day of February, 1980 at 9:30 A.M. At the time of the trial 
setting, the defendant, by and through his attorney, made a 
motion before the Court asking that the Complaint charging 
wreckless operation of a motor boat be dismissed because of 
the single criminal episode statute contained in section 
76-1-401 through 403, Utah Code Annotated. (T., p. 4-7) 
This motion was denied by Judge Keller on the basis that 
the bail on the exceeding a wakeless speed had not been for-
feited. (T., p. 3&9) Judge Keller indicated that he had not 
personally ap·proved the forfeiture and consequently, there 
was no forfeiture of bail on that citation. On the 19th day 
of Ap1il, 1979, Judge Floyd H. Gowans, the presiding Judge 
-3-
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of the Fiilh ','i~, .. ,it COULt, iSSl' :•r: ci.c1rninis tr at 1 v0 
01 May 7, l'l/0_ (k_, p.64-60) Thi1t tuil schedule establi""'"0 
bail for operJlln0 a motor boat in c 
speed at $25.00. 
After thc° Court denied the cl:' Eendant' s motion for dis-
missal based on L:he single crimina I episode, the def"ndant 
made a motion before the Court that the charge of exceeding 
a slow wakeless speed either be dismissed or tried before 
the wreckless operation of a motor boat charge. (T., p. 9 & 121 
Judge Keller denied this motion on the basis that there was 
no charge before his Court charging that the defendant had 
exceeded a slow wakeless speed. (T., p.10 & 13) The defendant 
then moved the Court to return to the defendant his $25. 00, 
but the Court denied this motion on the basis that the $25.00, 
which was then in the hands of the Park and Recreation Depart-
ment, was in fact bail for the wreckless operation of a motor 
boat charge. (T., p.17 & 18) 
Prior to the actual trial of the case, the defendant 
moved the Court for a dismissal of the action on the basis 
that the statute under which the defendant was charged with 
wreckless operation o~ a motor boat was unconstitutional~ 
vague. The statute in question provided that a person was 
guilty of wreckless operation of a motor boat if he operated 
the motor boat in ·a wreckless or negligent manner. This 
motion was denied by the Judge. (T. I p.18-21) 
-4-
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hcc tcstimnny P'-";;'nted at the lr:icil indicated th2lc 
Ui,' c!, 'llciant was op:cccttinq 1'1is motor bo'lt OL:ic,;icJ,_, 0f th2 
buo/s ,,;!ii,,-,. mark~'d the 1-1:ikc:cccss speed are:a s;1crounding the 
docL ('l'., p.86, L.10-lG, p.63, L.10) Th8 ~2fendant's 
bo 1t \-;,i,; travelling at 0:Jproximately three-rparter 
thro~tle and the defendant was paralleling the docking 
area outside of the buoys while he was observing the docks 
to see if the trailer was in position so that he could remove 
his boat from the water. (T., p.86, L.17 through p.89, L.15) 
The defendant and one of his passengers both testified that 
they observed a boat ahead of them and to the right_motion-
less in the water and an individual attempting to put on 
water skis. The defendant then directed his attention back 
to the dock and his trailer. After looking in that direction 
he again looked forward and was momentarily blinded by the 
sun reflecting off his windshield. (T., p.94, L.3 through 
p.95, L.23) As soon as he could focus his eyes, he became 
aware of the fact that the boat that had been sitting still 
in the water had accelerated at a rapid speed and pulled 
into his path. (T., p.20, L.3-10, p.61, L.9 through p.64, 
L.20; p.86, L.25 through p.87, L.12) About the time the 
defendant became aware of this, his passenger also noticed 
the boat and yelled for the defendant to change his course. 
(T., p.55, t. 5 through p.57, L,16; p.61, L.6 through p.62, 
L.14) The defendant then immediately turned his boat to the 
-5-
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present ei th2r the operator of tivc other boat or the passensc: 
of the oth2~ boat. The only witnesses available: 'or the pr05 ,_ 
cut ion were the passenger of the defendant's bo"t, the water 
skier and one of the water sLier's relatives w:10 had been 
standing on the shore approximately 150 yards away. The 
water skier testified that he had not seen the defendant's 
boat until the time of the impact. (T., p. 67, L.13-18) The 
state witnesses acknowledged that the boat that had been 
stopped and the boat which was towing the water skier took 
off at full speed and travelled into the path of the 
defendant's boat. (T., p.30, L.3-10; p.61, L.9 throughp.64, 
L.20; p.86, L.25 through p.87, L.12) 
Judge David B. Dee, when reviewing this matter on 
appeal, issued a Memorandum Decision in which he did not 
comment on any of the facts or issues of law presented on 
appeal except to state that 
.the State is not prohibited from 
prosecuting the defendant because of the 
single criminal episode statute and that the 
statute under which this defendant was tried 
is not unconstitutionally vague nor was the 
evidence insufficient to find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating 
the statute in question. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDA..NT W/1-5 DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
-6-
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>1 -1~-~· , :=., prohibited f.cfl!"'.1 subsequent pL-o.s2cut.j_o::1s if a per-
s·J'.1 11:.Lc been penal iz;-::d for an offense "1.risin'J out of the 
S'l''''- criminal episode. Section 76-1-401, Utah Code 
F~n~tated, 1953, as am 0 nded, defines a single criminal 
e?;sode as all conduct which is closely related in time 
ancJ in incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a 
single criminal object. At the time of the trial before 
the circuit court, Judge Keller stated on record that 
there was no question but that exceeding a wakeless speed 
and the wreckless operation of a motor boat were in fact 
results of a single criminal episode. (T., p. 6, L.14-23) 
The county attorney did not content otherwise. Judge 
Keller, however, stated that he had not personally approved 
the forfeiture and therefore, no jeopardy had attached 
and consequently, the prosecution for the wreckless operation 
of a motor boat was not prohibited. (T., p.24 through p.?.S, 
L.17) 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the defendant 
was sent a letter by the circuit court stating that he could 
forfeit bail on the citation of exceeding a wakeless speed 
and that the case would be closed. In addition, the circuit 
court had established a bail schedule by court order. Pursuant 
thereto the clerk of the court accepted the bail forwarded by 
-7-
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took the mor;. 0 y and presently hcLo it in its coffe1:. Approxi-
mately one month thereafter the county attorney's office 
issued a ne~ complaint charginq wreckless operation of a m~m 
boat at the same time, place and based upon the same circumst;: 
It is the position of the defendant that the State of 
Utah is absolutely barred from instigating a separate cornplair-
in light of the fact that it accepted a bail forfeiture on a 
criminal citation which involved a single criminal episode. 
It is also the position of the defendant that the judge harim 
established a bail schedule and having authorized the clerk tc 
forward a letter to defendants coming before the court authon: 
them to forfeit bail cannot at a later date claim that the ba: 
forfeiture has no consequences because he personally did not 
approve it. It was an established practice of this circuit 
court as well as all other circuit courts to allow bail fu~ 
feitures without personal approval of the individual judges. 
It should be noted that the Parks and Recreation Department 
still has the defendant's forfeited bail and to this date has 
not returned it to him. 
After Judge Keller refused to dismiss the wreckless 
operation charge as requested by the defendant, the defen~~ 
moved the court to either dismiss the exceeding a wakele 55 
. c' 
speed charge or to try it prior to the wreck less operation ' 
-8-
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,Judge Kelli.er re~ f1ised to do so 
t !«2 court. Sectinn 77-11-9 indicates that a citation 
1uich is filPd \'1.Li~.h the magistrate r:uy be used in lieu 
of a complaint to which a person may plead guilty or on 
which bail may be posted and forfeited. The court has 
ruled that the bail has not been forfeited on that citation 
and has refused to either dismiss the citation or proceed 
with a trial on it. The court obviously made this ruling 
because it realized that if the defendant was found guilty 
on the citation or if the citation was dismissed, the court 
would be prohibited from proceeding on the wreckless opera-
tion of a motor vehicle charge. For some reason Judge Keller 
had determined that the defendant would be tried on the latter 
charge regardless of what the law or rules of procedure 
had to say about the matter. 
The evidence produced at the time of the trial 
demonstrated that the defendant was operating his motor 
boat outside of the wakeless area on Echo Reservoir. He was 
proceeding in a direct line of traffic at a constant rate 
of speed. A boat which was towing a water skier was 
sitting in the water to the defendant's right. While the 
defendant was in full view, the other boat started up and 
pulled directly into the path of t~e defendant's vehicle 
causing a collision between the defendant's boat and the 
water skier being pulled by the other boat. Based upon this 
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.'I ' --~ q I I i_ l t y 
thirty day~; ~n i ,1 i L. 
It is the l'O-jition of thsc c1:'1:·,cndant thot ~Tud·.J-c Kcll~r', 
actions und ,1udy~ Dee's confirTTlil~L"l of those Jctl.c,r1;; hy deny, 
the defendant's ilppeal constitui-c a violation of the ck•fendant' 
right of due rirocess of law as pre.Hided by both the state and 
federal constitutions. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE CHARGING THE DEFENDANT WITH WRECKLESS OPEF!· 
TION OF A MOTOR BOAT IN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
Title 73, Chapter 18, Section 12-1, of the Utah Code 
Annotated, states that a person is guilty of the wreckless 
operation of a motor boat if he operates the motor boat ina 
wreckless or negligent manner so as to endanger the life, 
limb or property of another. This statute incorporates two 
separate definitions. One is the wreckless operation of a 
motor boat and the other is the negligent operation. The 
state code does not give any definition for wreckless or 
negligent operation of a boat. Consequently, it of necessity 
incorporates the definitions of civil law negligence. There 
is a substantial difference between wreckless operation md 
negligent operation. The negligent operation of a boat 
could include such things as failing to keep a proper look-
out, failing to yield right-of-way and other violations which 
under criminal law constitute lesser offenses which do n~ 
-10-
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th~ d2Jnndant cannot be pro3ecuted under 
it n,· '.·,,nvictccl under it. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judge committed prejudicial error and denied the 
ct~ ,.,,,(!:mt his due process of law when he failed to dismiss the 
wreckl2ss operation of a motor vehicle charge. The Court 
accepted and forfeited the defendant's bail on the citation 
ctarging him with exceeding a wakeless speed and the wreckless 
o;ieration of a motor boat charge grew out of a single criminal 
episode, and was, therefore, barred by Section 76-1-403, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
The statute under which the defendant was prosecuted, 
wreckless operation of a motor boat, was unconstitutionally 
vague in that it permitted the Judge to find the defendant 
guilty of wreckless operation on the basis of failing to yield 
right-of-way and failing to keep a proper look-out, both of 
which are, in fact, criminal violations of lesser severity. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant requests that the Court reverse 
the decision of the lower court finding the defendant not guilty 
as charged. 
DATED this day of December, 1980. 
-11-
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Appellant-
Defendant 
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I hereby ccrti f:i U1:.!L P:-1i led a tL uc·· _,!\ l correct 
copy of the foregoing Grief of Appellant to the Summit 
County Attorney's Office, Summit County Courti10use, Coalvii' 
Utah 84107, on this the day of December, 1980. 
JEANNINE C. DAMEW01'TH 
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